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The attitude towards inflation has changed radically over the last decade. 
This changing was motivated, basically, by three factors: a) the high cost of 
inflation during the decades of 1970 and 1980; b) the less than expected 
global disinflation costs during the decade of 1990 and; c) the significant 
progress, in the last ten years, of the literature about the costs and benefits of 
inflation. Indeed, today one knows that inflation costs are well above than 
those estimated in the beginning of the decade of 1990. Part of this 
difference is due to the better identification and measurement of the 
perverse interaction between inflation and the tax system. By the other hand, 
some arguments in favour of “some” inflation have also gained terrain in the 
same period. And, despite the difficulties found when estimating some of 
specific inflation costs, there is currently a consensus that the overriding 
objective of monetary policy should be price stability. However, the 
advance of the literature was not yet capable of establishing what the 
optimal inflation rate is. This paper aims to show, in short, what are the 
main costs and benefits of inflation in the light of the last advances in the 
specialized literature. In this way, it aims to contribute to the discussion 
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The attitude towards inflation has changed radically over the last decade, especially 
concerning central banks behaviour. This change can be noticed under different 
perspectives. In the beginning of the 90’s New Zealand begun a new attitude by central 
banks regarding inflation, assuming explicitly that the overriding objective of the 
monetary authority is price stability. Since then, several central banks have decided to 
adopt the inflation targeting regime and this number keeps growing. 
 
This change of behaviour was motivated, among other factors, by verifying that the rise 
of inflation in several countries during the decades of 1970 and 1980 did not bring any 
benefits in terms of higher output growth, on the contrary, the costs were high. Besides 
that, the global fall of inflation rates during the decade of 1990 showed that the costs of 
disinflation could be smaller than expected. 
3 And, notwithstanding the fact that during 
this period disinflation was benefited from benign supply shocks as, for example, the 
fall of the price of oil and several commodities as well, it became clearer with time that 
the new attitude of central banks towards inflation was the key ingredient behind the 
lower perceived cost of reducing inflation, i.e sacrifice ratio.
4 
 
In the academic environment, the rise of inflation rates during the decades of 1970 and 
1980, in some countries sharply, provided the missing ingredient to establish 
empirically the link between inflation and growth. With the then available data, it was 
not possible to detect the adverse inflation effects on economic growth. In fact, during 
the decade of 90, benefiting from the previous two high inflation decades experiences, 
evidences of the existence of a long run negative relation between inflation and 
economic growth has begun to appear with frequency (Fischer, 1993; Barro, 1995; 
Sarel, 1996; Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Ghosh and Phillips, 1998).
5 
 
                                                           
3 In some cases, as in the United States, the fall of inflation came together with the fall of unemployment 
rates and increase of economic growth rates. 
4 According to several economists this phenomenon was caused by the increase of central banks’ 
credibility. Blinder (1998), by the other hand, alerts that in spite of the appealing popularity of this 
argument, there are no evidences that it is true.   
5 In the short run, it was already broadly accepted, especially by central banks, the existence of a trade-off 
between inflation and growth.  6
Empirical studies show, however, that this link is significant only in high inflation 
cases. Barro (1995), finds evidences that an increase of ten percentage points in 
inflation reduces economic growth between 0,2 e 0,3 percentage points per year. Note, 
however, that his results are fragile if one wants to make inferences at inflation rates 
below 15%. Using a non-parametric approach, Bruno e Easterly (1998) show that the 
transition probability to inflation rates higher than 100% increases rapidly when 
inflation is above 40%, value that is considered by the authors a break point.
6 Sarel 
(1996) finds evidences that inflation rates above 8% harm economic growth.
7 Ghosh e 
Phillips (1998) show that the adverse effects on growth occur from inflation rates as low 
as 3%. 
 
Despite the lack of robustness found in some studies, one should stress that an 
increasing number of papers have been finding evidences that there is a negative 
relationship between inflation and long run economic growth.
8 Moreover, the inflation 
breakpoint value – defined as the level of inflation beyond which the harmful effects on 
growth begin to appear – have been found to be smaller and smaller. Finally, as points 
out O'Reilly (1998), almost no study finds statistically positive coefficients for inflation. 
 
The above picture has produced consensus among economists and central bankers that 
high inflation rates are harmful to growth and, therefore, are undesirable and should be 
avoided. More specifically, despite the dispersion found in the estimates regarding the 
inflation breakpoint value, there is a trend to consider high inflation rates as those above 
one digit (e.g. Fischer, 1996; Black HWDOOL, 1998; Coletti e O'Reilly, 1998; Mishkin e 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000).
9 Therefore, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship 
between inflation and economic growth is still inconclusive for inflation rates below 
10%. Even though, there is a consensus that price stability should be the main objective 
of monetary policy. How one can conciliate these two facts? 
 
                                                           
6 According to the authors, this might happen due to the fact that there may be a tendency to index 
nominal variables explicitly when inflation reaches this level. 
7 Sarel finds evidences of non-linearity in the Phillips curve, and shows that if one does not take this into 
account, the adverse inflation effects will be underestimated. 
8 Some results depend crucially on the inclusion of very high inflation rates countries, or the results are 
very sensitive to the period under analysis. 
9 One factor that helps to explain this dispersion is that those studies differ with regard to the used 
methodologies and their rigour. Moreover, as it will be seen, inflation costs depend, in a great extent, on 
the institutional features of each country.  7
Some factors help to elucidate this apparent paradox. First, the absence of an empirical 
relationship does not imply, necessarily, that it does not exist. The methodology used in 
those studies – regression equations for specific countries, cross-section e panel data – 
may have difficulties to find a relationship between those variables for low inflation. 
 
This may occur due to several reasons, for instance: there are data limitations, since it 
still does not exist long periods of low inflation. This fact imposes important difficulties 
to this kind of study.
10 There are difficulties to identify and control the effects of other 
variables than inflation, especially shocks, on the economy. These shocks may mask the 
benefits of low inflation. In this regard, the relationship between inflation and economic 
growth depends not only on the nature of the shocks that hits the economy but, mainly, 
on the central bank reaction function.
11 Moreover, inflation costs depend on institutional 
factors as, for example, the degree of indexation in the economy, especially of the tax 
system, and on labour legislation, which differs among economies.  
 
Second, as argues Briault (1995), there are well established theoretical reasons that 
show why inflation, and uncertainty about inflation, reduce social welfare. Actually, 
inflation costs study is an old subject and the economic literature mention several 
specific motives through which inflation decreases social welfare. Note, however, that 
there are also arguments about the benefits of inflation. 
 
Therefore, besides the literature that seeks to verify the existence of a relationship 
between inflation and economic growth, there is also a broad literature that aims to 
identify and measure several specific inflation costs and benefits. The latter, however, 
uses another methodology; one that is essentially microeconomic based, and therefore 
differs from the first, which uses time series techniques and regression analysis. In this 
context, several studies show that even low inflation rates have relevant social welfare 
effects. 
 
                                                           
10 This fact is even more relevant since, as argue Coletti e O’Reilly (1998), the theoretical arguments in 
favour of low inflation rates show that: a) the benefits of price stability take a long time to materialize. As 
it will be seen, inflation uncertainty can remain high by long spells after the fall of current inflation; b) the 
benefits of low inflation are relatively small each year, despite its permanent effects. By the other hand, 
disinflation costs are big and generally temporary.   
11 For example, if the central bank reacts to an increase in inflation by tightening monetary policy, it will 
be, at least in the short run, a negative relationship between inflation and growth.  8
Third, some specific inflation costs listed by this literature are difficult to measure 
empirically. Actually, what one wants to investigate is whether inflation affects 
society’s welfare, and in what way this happens. In this regard it is essential to 
understand that GDP is an imperfect social welfare indicator, although both variables 
are clearly correlated. Some of the costs of inflation are not captured by GDP, even 
though they decrease social welfare. For instance, if price stability foster also greater 
economic stability it will increase social welfare, even if one assumes that inflation does 
not affect long term economic growth. In fact, Hess e Morris (1996) show evidences 
that there is a positive relationship in the long run between the level of inflation and 
output’s variability.
12 Moreover, as alert Parkin (1997), some of the inflation costs are 
actually counted as benefits since they increase GDP, for example: the growth of the 
financial system.  
 
Fourth, one cannot ignore the experience, even though still very recent, of those 
countries which have been aiming price stability as the foremost policy objective, and 
have been experiencing notable economic performance as, for example, the United 
States and England. It is worth noticing that in those countries price stability has not 
produced higher output volatility, but rather the opposite.
13 
 
The change of behaviour with regard to inflation and the fact that several industrialized 
countries have achieved inflation rates near or compatible with price stability has lead to 
a favourable environment in which the study of the costs and benefits of inflation has 
gained much interest. This fact is easily verified by the large growth of papers written 
about this subject, and by the realization of several seminars about price stability in the 
last years. 
 
Behind this discussion lies not only the search for a better understanding of the costs 
and benefits of inflation but, mainly, by the attempt of determining the optimal inflation 
rate. That is, one seeks to determine how low inflation should be in the long run, or yet, 
what is the inflation target that maximises society’s social welfare. 
                                                           
12 According to Meltzer (1997), during the well succeed disinflation period in the last fifteen years, the 
United States experienced the most stable cyclic period ever. Meltzer argues that recessions are, 
generally, caused by "particular inflationary imbalances". Poole (1999) says that the recent experience of 
the United States suggests that low inflation not only decreases inflation’s variability but also output’s 
variability.  9
In this way, this paper has three main objectives. First, review briefly the literature 
about the benefits of price stability and, more specifically, some studies that identify or 
quantify the specific costs and benefits of inflation. As already observed, despite being 
an old issue, this literature experienced a strong growth in the last decade. Second, show 
preliminary evidences of some costs of inflation for Brazil. Third, based in the 
abovementioned review proposes a long term inflation target for Brazil. 
 
Since the adoption of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil, in the middle of 1999, the 
inflation targets were: 8% in 1999, 6% in 2000, 4% in 2001, and 3,5% in 2002. 
Recently, the inflation target for 2003 was set at 3,25%.
14 As the inflation target start to 
get closer to rates compatible to the concept of price stability, the debate about what 
should be the long term inflation target for Brazil will increase undoubtedly. This paper 
aims at providing subsidies that can be useful to this decision. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: next section discusses the operational definition of 
price stability and the difficulties associated with it. Section 3 shows what the main 
inflation costs are, along with some preliminary evidences for Brazil. Section 4 shows 
what the inflation benefits are. Section 5 analyzes the current stage of the literature 
about the cost-benefit of price stability and shows some empirical evidences about the 
net benefits of low inflation. Based in the international experience and in the study of 
inflation costs and benefits, section 6 gives some clues about what should be the long-





Given the current consensus that price stability must be the overriding objective of 
monetary policy, it is important to know what economists understand by this concept. 
Literally speaking, price stability means that the economy’s price level remains 
unchanged. Obviously, this does not prevent that changes in relative prices exist, 
however in the aggregate the price level does not change. In other words, the inflation 
rate equals zero 
                                                                                                                                                                          
13 See last footnote.  10
 
Nonetheless, this is not the concept that is in economists’ and central bankers minds 
when one talks about price stability. When one says that the main objective of monetary 
policy is price stability one really means that central banks must have as an objective 
low and stable inflation rates.
15 
 
One definition of price stability which has been much used is the one proposed by 
Greenspan (1996): “Price stability obtains when economic agents no longer take 
account of the prospective change in the general price level in their economic decision-
making”. The definition used by Blinder (1995) is similar: “The definition I’ve long 
used for price stability is a situation where ordinary people in their ordinary course of 
business are not thinking and worrying about inflation”. Nonetheless these definitions 
are conceptually correct, they do not provide any clue about how low inflation should 
be. 
 
Actually, even small inflation rates can have important effects in the long run, and 
cannot be ignored in the decision-making process. For example, consider that a 3% 
annual inflation rate meets the requirements proposed by Greenspan and Blinder. In 20 
years, which is a period used in various economic contracts, the purchasing power of 
money will be reduced in, approximately, 80%. If the contract is longer, 30 years, a very 
common period in real estate deals, this value raises to around 140%. 
 
Meltzer (1997) defines price stability as "an inflation rate so close to zero that it ceases 
to be a significant factor in long-term planning". Even though this definition is more 
precise than the previous ones, it also does not mention a specific value or interval. 
 
Despite the intrinsic difficulties associated to the meaning of price stability, according 
to Fischer (1996), the central banks define it operationally as inflation rates between 1% 
and 3%. Some economists, however, consider 3% a high inflation rate for this purpose 
(Meltzer, 1997). Anyway, it is important to notice that no economist considers inflation 
rates higher than 3% compatible with price stability. By the other hand, some 
economists support inflation rates equal to zero. Therefore, one can say that the 0%-3% 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 Note that there is a two-percentage point interval around the central target. 
15 Vickers (1999), for example, uses this concept.  11
interval encompasses all inflation rates that are considered coherent with the concept of 
price stability. 
 
A crucial question at this point is: why price stability is not associated with a zero 
inflation rate, that is, with price level stability? Basically, there are two motives: 
economic ones, which will be dealt in the next sections, and the “statistical” ones, which 
makes explicit the difficulties associated with the correct measurement of inflation. In 
this sense, both factors must be taken into consideration when one talks about price 
stability. 
 
For example, changes in the quality of goods, the creation of new goods and the 
substitution of goods in the consumption basket make measured inflation overestimate 
the “true” inflation. The example given by Greenspan (1996) is very useful in this 
regard: 
 
“How, for example, should we decompose the enormous increase in 
nominal expenditure on medical care in recent years into its “price” 
and “quantity” components? Consider the case of cataract surgery. 
Forty years ago, the typical cataract patient had to endure a hospital 
stay of seven days, and required extensive post-operative vision 
correction because the eye’s natural lenses had been removed. Today, 
the typical patient is treated on an outpatient basis. Furthermore, in 
many cases the patient does not require any vision correction after the 
operation because artificial lenses have been employed. In light of 
these enormous quality improvements, we obviously cannot treat the 
unadjusted fee for a single operation as “the price of cataract surgery”. 
Instead, we must attempt to quantify the value of these improvements, 
and adjust our price indexes accordingly.” 
 
Indeed, empirical studies show that measured inflation rates overestimate the “true” 
inflation, and that the bias can be significant. Recent studies show that in the United 
States inflation is overestimated in, approximately, 0,65% (Gordon, 2000), and between 
0,5% e 0,7% in Canada (Crawford HWDOOL, 1998). In this case, the operational definition 
of price stability will not be equal to zero inflation, but rather to a positive inflation rate 
numerically equal to the size of the bias.  
 
However not everyone agrees that the bias should be taken into consideration when one 
defines operationally price stability. Summers (1996) argues that the bias is not relevant  12
when establishing an inflation target. In his words: “When I think about my future, I 
think about what it will cost in the future to buy a house or a tennis racket or a college 
education for my kids, and it's the sticker price, not the quality-adjusted change in cost, 
that I care about.” Fischer (1996) adds: "The impact of this bias on the optimal inflation 
rate of inflation is not self-evident if money illusion matters for real resource allocation" 
 
Actually, despite the consensus that measured inflation is overestimated, there is a gap 
in the literature about the relevance of this bias in the definition of price stability, and 
how it affects monetary policy. Generally, economists do not deal in depth with this 
question. There are no studies about until what extent the bias is relevant to consumers’ 
decision-making and to implementing monetary policy. Indeed, the debate about the 
costs and benefits of price stability, focus mainly in the economic motives. As one can 
see the operational definition of price stability is not a trivial task, even for good 
economists. 
 
As it will become clear along the paper, price stability should be understood as a 
concept that is much broader than just the simple requirement of a low and stable 
inflation rate, whatever this rate is, but rather and above all as an state characterized by 
low and stable inflation expectations, that is, low inflation uncertainty. 
 
Another question that is closely related to this discussion is the concept of optimal rate 
of inflation, that is, the inflation rate that maximises the society’s welfare. Besides the 
statistical factors, now the economic factors play an essential role. Although both issues 
are related to each other, they raise distinct questions. One can say that price stability is 
a concept, while the optimal rate of inflation is its operational definition. 
 
Graph 1 shows, for some industrialized countries, the phenomenon of the global fall of 
inflation rates during the decade of 1990 and the change of behaviour regarding 
inflation, that is, the quest for price stability. One can see that these countries have 
recently achieved inflation rates compatible with the concept of price stability. None of 
the nine listed countries had average inflation rate above 3% in the last five years, as 




















































































































































Inflation (CPI) of Some Industrialized Countries: Five Years Averages 
&RXQWU\      
United States  6.75% 8.89% 5.48% 3.96% 3.12% 2.48% 
Canada  7.33% 8.74% 7.42% 4.46% 2.25% 1.73% 
Australia  10.24%  10.57%  8.30% 7.92% 2.50% 1.92% 
Japan  11.38%  6.63% 2.76% 1.35% 1.37% 0.30% 
New Zealand  10.19%  14.80%  12.01%  9.59% 2.05% 1.45% 
Germany  6.13% 4.04% 3.88% 1.36% 3.13% 1.35% 
Sweden  7.95%  10.50%  8.99% 6.21% 4.17% 0.47% 
Swiss  7.68% 2.34% 4.28% 2.51% 3.15% 0.75% 
United Kingdom  13.00%  14.36%  7.19% 5.93% 3.40% 2.70% 





Inflation impinges upon society two kinds of costs: economic costs and social costs. 
These costs are originated both by expected and non expected inflation.
16 It is important 
to notice, therefore, that inflation costs do not stem only from its level but, mainly, from 
the uncertainty regarding its future values even though, as it will be seen, both facts are 
correlated. 
                                                           
16 Colleti and O’Reilly 1998) make the following differentiation: “Fully expected inflation is inflation 
that is correctly predicted by all individuals in the economy. Fully anticipated inflation is inflation that is  14
Inflation provokes loss of social welfare basically for two reasons: a) it makes economic 
agents change their behaviour. These (defensive) changes imply efficiency loss as 
efforts are diverted from more productive activities to less productive activities, whose 
only goal is to protect economic agents’ income and wealth against inflation effects; b) 
inflation decreases the quality of the information provided by the price system and 
increases uncertainty regarding the future, distorting efficient resource allocation. As a 
consequence, not always the decisions made in the present will be revealed to be the 
best ones in the future, even though given the information available at the time they 




One of the first inflation costs identified in the literature stems from the fact that 
inflation acts as a tax on money balances that individuals hold. Since money does not 
earn interest its purchase power decreases when there is inflation. The higher inflation is 
the higher the inflation tax will be and the higher the decreasing of purchasing power. 
Since money is an essential good, in the presence of inflation economic agents change 
their behaviour trying to minimize their losses instead of just quitting using money. This 
change of behaviour causes economic inefficiency as people spend time and resources 
trying to protect themselves against inflation. 
 
For example, as inflation rises people go more often to banks in order to withdraw 
money, since they desire to keep less currency in their pockets. In this way, the time 
consumed trying to minimize the effects of the inflationary tax produces loss of social 
welfare. This kind of cost is known in the literature as shoe leathercosts, and it is 
represented by the appropriate area under the demand curve for money.
17 In order to 
finish with this inefficiency, given that the marginal cost of producing money is 
practically equal to zero, Friedman proposed that the nominal interest rate should be 
zero. This means that inflation must be negative and equal to the real interest rate.  Note 
however that with the advances of technology and the creation of new financial 
instruments and ways of payment, this cost has decreased considerably nowadays. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
fully expected and adapted to by all individuals in the economy”. In this paper both expressions are 
considered equivalent. 
17 It depends, among other things, on the functional form of the demand for money function and on its 
interest rate sensitiveness.  15
 
Inflation also provokes more general changes in behaviour, which are not related to the 
demand for money. As inflation rises, the variability of relative prices also increases, 
and the quality of the information provided by the price system decreases.
18 In this case, 
it is not easy to differentiate whether price increases are due to changes in relative prices 
or simply caused by decreases in the purchasing power of money. In this way, decisions 
taken based on relative prices in a given moment may prove themselves wrong later. 
The costs involved can be high mainly if the decisions affect long-term investments. 
 
Note also that besides increasing the dispersion of relative prices inflation also increases 
the dispersion among prices of the same good. That is, decisions about buying or selling 
are taken in an environment of greater uncertainty. Therefore, it is more difficult to 
make the correct decisions. Second, according to Coletti and O’Reilly (1998), the 
increase in uncertainty can cause overinvestment (or underinvestment) in some goods, 
implying high adjustment costs in the future.
 
Graph 2 shows, for Brazil, that there is a strong positive relation between the inflation 
level, measured by the Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA), and the dispersion of 
relative prices, measured by the standard deviation among the 52 groups that forms the 
IPCA. Another interesting result is that it seems to be a qualitative change in this 
relation when monthly inflation rates are above 4%; above this value, there is an 
increase in the relative variability of inflation. 
 
But why inflation increases price dispersion? Part of the answer makes another inflation 
cost explicit. Price changes involve costs that include, among others, the substitution of 
price tags and the making of new price lists. This cost is known in the literature as menu 
costs. As a consequence, the entrepreneur will only change his product’s prices from the 
moment that the gains of doing so is greater than the cost involved. This means that 
price changes are usually realized in discrete intervals. As inflation rises price changes 
also increase, augmenting price dispersion. Note, however, that due to the improvement 
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Inflation also increases price dispersion due to other reasons. Each firm has a different 
cost structure and specific policies concerning price changes, these factors means that 
price changes are not synchronized.
19 
 
In the same manner that inflation distorts information provided by the price system of 
good and services markets, it also distorts the functioning of the labour market. Inflation 
increases wage dispersion among different categories of workers and within the same 
group of workers as well, causing misallocation of resources in the labour market. In 
other words, inflation acts as sand in the wheels of the labour market. 
 
It is not difficult to conclude that the higher inflation is the higher the need of people 
and firms to spend time and resources searching prices, so as to their decisions are less 
affected by the distortions caused by inflation. In the same way it is not difficult to 
notice that this situation causes economic inefficiency and decreases social welfare.
20 
 
At the time inflation was high in Brazil, these costs were evident and high. For example, 
during that period it was easy to observe a huge growth in the size of firms’ accounting 
                                                                                                                                                                          
18 As already observed, even with zero inflation relative prices of goods and services vary. 
19 For example, some firms may continue to sell their products by the “old” price, until the inventories 
built with cheaper prices finish. For other firms, as soon as new and more expensive products arrive the 
whole inventory prices go up. 
20 As points out Briault (1995), even though by the individual viewpoint it is worthwhile to spend time 
and resources forecasting inflation, by the social viewpoint this behaviour produces inefficiency.  17
departments. Regardless whether there is legal monetary correction of balances or not, 
with high inflation traditional accounting does not reflect precisely the true patrimonial 
situation of firms anymore. In this regard, there is the need to calculate the real value of 
items and to take into account the effects of inflation on firms’ profits. As a 
consequence, productive resources are diverted into this type of activity.  
 
Another consequence of inflation is the growth of the size of the financial system in 
relation to GDP.
21 Note that this growth is not due to the increase in the level of activity 
but rather due to the attempts of minimizing the undesirable effects of inflation. The 
higher need that economic agents have to protect themselves against inflation, foster the 
creation by banks of several financial instruments. Once again, productive resources are 
diverted form more productive activities in order to minimize the costs of inflation. 
 
Among the numerous costs of inflation, empirical studies emphasize the one originated 
by the perverse interaction between inflation and the tax system. 
22 In general, the tax 
system and economic contracts are not perfectly indexed to inflation. As a consequence, 
inflation causes an increase in the effective tax rate. The higher the inflation rate the 
higher the increase in the effective tax rate.
23 
 
The interaction between inflation and the tax system provokes several undesirable 
consequences as, for example, the decrease of disposable income and, therefore, the 
aggregate consumption level. This happens every time the income tax table is not 
corrected by the inflation, and economic agents are taxed over their nominal income and 
not over their real income. Besides that inflation distorts savings and investment 
decisions, since the real return of investment and financial applications are adversely 
affected by inflation. This happens mainly because capital and interest rate gains due 
exclusively to inflation are treated as taxable income. 
 
With regard to interest payments, notice that inflation widens the difference between the 
interest rate paid by the debtor and the interest rate effectively received by the creditor 
                                                           
21 Another indicator, which shows this phenomenon, is the increase of the number of people working in 
the financial system. 
22 According to empirical studies, among several estimable costs of inflation, this is the most significant. 
23 Notice that, if at each period nominal values over which tax is levied are not corrected by inflation, 
even if the inflation rate is stable the effective tax will raise period after period.  18
(Dewald, 1998). This occurs since, in general, creditors are taxed over nominal interest 
gains. Besides that, debtors are generally allowed to deduct nominal interest payments. 
In this way the tax burden impinged on creditors are higher than the one impinged upon 
debtors (Smal, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, notice that inflation distorts investment decisions by decreasing the real 
value of depreciation, since accountancy rules in general does not take into 
consideration all inflation effects on investment values. This fact affects adversely the 




The aforementioned costs occur even if inflation is perfectly anticipated. Actually, in 
real world inflation is not perfectly anticipated since its future values are always 
uncertain, i.e. there is inflation uncertainty.
24 Empirical evidences show that the higher 
the inflation rate is the higher the inflation uncertainty is.
25 
 
According to Vickers (1999) that happens, among other factors, due to the fact that 
when inflation is high inflation expectations are not anchored and begin to drift. Coletti 
and O’Reilly (1998) argue that countries have high inflation rates because they try to 
achieve unfeasible objectives through unsustainable policies, which creates an outlook 
of uncertainty. In this way, the smaller current inflation is the smaller uncertainty 
regarding its future values is. Golob (1994) mention the uncertainty produced by the 
timing and by the effects of short run policies aiming at reducing inflation. Ball (1992) 
draws attention to the uncertainty stemmed from policymakers’ preferences, given the 
existence of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment in the short run. 
 
Graph 3 shows, for Brazil, preliminary evidences that there exist a positive relationship 
between the level of inflation and the degree of inflation uncertainty. The standard 
deviation of (the logarithmic of) monthly inflation, for each year, was used as a SUR[\ 
for inflation uncertainty. 
                                                           
24 Note that, even if inflation is anticipated, it also produces uncertainty by increasing the variability of 
relative prices and by distorting information provided by the price system. 
25 In this regard see Golob (1994).  19
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A brief digression is necessary at this point concerning the techniques used in the 
literature to measure inflation uncertainty and its limitations. Different empirical studies 
have used different proxies in order to measure inflation uncertainty.
26 The first studies 
used the inflation variability with this purpose. Later on, due to the limitation of this 
procedure two new techniques arose. The first one measures inflation uncertainty 
through market surveys about inflation expectations. Recently, the use of econometric 
inflation forecast models have been the most used technique. 
 
The use of inflation variability with the aim of measuring inflation uncertainty has some 
limitations since many times it is possible to forecast changes in inflation and, therefore, 
the use of the standard deviation can overestimate the “true” uncertainty. By the other 
hand opinion surveys may be misleading, since some of the participants are not in 
charge of relevant decisions. It might be important differences between expectations, 
and the degree of risk aversion, of those who make the forecasts and those who actually 
bet or invest. Finally, not all economic agents have access to econometric inflation 
forecast models. Moreover, differences among forecasts produced by different models 
may be substantial.
27 This fact suggests that inflation expectations may be very 
heterogeneous. 
                                                           
26 A survey of the techniques used in several studies can be found in O’Reilly (1998). 
27 For example, univariate forecast models of inflation do not consider other information when forecasting  20
 
Additionally, several factors that produce uncertainty as, for example, the political and 
institutional environment, are not taken into account by those models. Generally, these 
factors are the main source of uncertainties. One must bear in mind that this procedure 
is subject to the same kind of criticism of opinion surveys, since economists who 
estimate models and write papers about inflation uncertainty do not make decisions. 
 
However, despite the limitations of this procedure, this paper use the standard deviation 
of inflation with the aim of measuring inflation uncertainty, basically due to two 
motives: a) it is easy to calculate; b) opinion surveys about inflation expectations have 
only begun to be carried out very recently in Brazil. In this sense, the results show in 
Graph 3 should be taken as preliminary. Anyway, one expects that, in some degree, 
inflation variability and inflation uncertainty be correlated. 
 
The main costs of inflation uncertainty stem from the fact that it also produces 
uncertainty about future interest rates. By the Fisher equation (equation 1), the nominal 
interest rate is equal to the expected rate of inflation plus the real interest rate. When 
inflation is perfectly anticipated, changes in nominal interest rates reflect basically 
changes in inflation expectations. However, when there is inflation uncertainty, 
economic agents demand a risk premium that will be included in the required real 
interest rate (equation 2). This happens because there is no certainty regarding the real 
interest rate in the future. 
 
U 5
H + =p  (1)
g + = F U  (2) 
 
where: p
e = expected inflation rate; U = real interest rate;  = F  riskless real interest rate 
and g = inflation uncertainty risk premium. 
 
In this way, the higher the inflation rate the higher the degree of inflation uncertainty 
and the higher the risk premium embedded in the required real interest rate and, 
therefore, the higher the nominal interest rate. Notice, moreover, that the existence of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
future inflation values.  21
inflation uncertainty makes it harder to measure the “true” real interest rate required by 
economic agents. 
 
Graph 4 shows, as expected, that there is a strong positive relation between the volatility 
of inflation and the volatility of interest rate. This fact shows that the higher the inflation 
the higher the uncertainty about future interest rates.
28 As a consequence, high inflation 
rates are associated with high real interest rates, as Graph 5 shows. Note that the 
negative real interest rates that appears on the graph are mainly the consequence of 
several stabilization plans and others interventions in the economy. 
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After verifying that inflation uncertainty also means interest rate uncertainty, which is 
one of the key prices of the economy, one can identify more accurately and understand 
more clearly its costs. The most intuitive cost of inflation uncertainty is the allocation 
cost. Actually, inflation uncertainty interferes in several manners in the efficient 
resource allocation. Empirical evidence suggests that the costs originated from inflation 
uncertainty are higher than those that are originated from relative prices dispersion 
(Coletti e O’Reilly, 1998). 
 
 
                                                           
28 Despite the abovementioned limitations, the implicit assumption is that a variable’s variability indicates 
the uncertainty regarding its future values.  22
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Decisions from consumers, banks and government about buying, selling, saving and 
investing depend not only on current prices and interest rates but also mainly on their 
future values. Therefore, besides the uncertainty about future prices of goods and 
services the uncertainty about the future real interest rate, which is a key variable for 
investment and saving decisions, interferes in the efficient resource allocation and 
economic agents planning. Note that the allocation costs are independent from the fact 
whether the forecast are proved to be right, since uncertainty interferes at the time 
decisions are taken. 
 
By raising the real interest rates paid by the government, inflation uncertainty increases 
the cost of public debt. Therefore, the higher the price stability the lesser the inflation 
uncertainty will be and the higher the government’s saving with interest payments. This 
extra saving means higher resources to be spent in other areas (e.g. health, education) or 
the possibility of decreasing tax rates. 
 
Notice that the increase of the real interest rate does not disappear completely with the 
issuing of inflation indexed public bonds, since generally only a fraction of the public 
debt is post-indexed.
29 Moreover, the increase of inflation can raise other types of 
uncertainties, such as those originated by political risk or even default risk. All these 
                                                           
29 The existence of pre-fixed public bonds decreases the efficiency of monetary policy. This 
inconvenience, among others, prevent that the entire public debt is indexed to inflation.  23
kinds of risk are embedded in the real interest rate and, therefore, the issuing of inflation 
indexed bonds minimises, but not solves the problem. 
 
In a broader way, inflation uncertainty raises all kinds of interest rates within the 
economy, and not only those paid by the government. Although in an asymmetrical way 
inflation uncertainty raises short, medium and long run interest rates.
30 The rise of 
interest rates discourage investment overall in the economy.  Inn other words: the fall of 
interest rates due to lesser uncertainty provokes a rise in the amount of disposable 
resources available to investment by the private sector (crowding in). 
 
Another intuitive effect of inflation uncertainty is to shorten economic agents’ planning 
periods. Inflation uncertainty discourages economic agents to adopt long-term contracts, 
whether because its cost is prohibitively high or because they do not exist. These 
contracts are important since they provide greater protection and predictability 
(especially prefixed contracts). 
 
In some cases, inflation uncertainty may lead to the disappearance of some markets. 
According to Coletti e O’Reilly (1998) this was what happened with the 25-year-fixed-
rate mortgages in Canada, which with price stability have resumed recently. In Brazil, 
the examples are even more incisive since some types of markets have never existed as, 
for example, the long-term prefixed public bonds market and the long-term prefixed 
financing real estate market. Even in the case of the more common post-fixed real state 
financing market, the interaction of high and uncertain inflation together with the 
incomplete indexation of instalments have contributed to a large decrease in the amount 
of real state financing in Brazil.
31 
 
Notice that despite the fall of inflation in the last years, the continuing existence of an 
environment of high inflationary uncertainty has been preventing the adoption of longer 
economic contracts and, more precisely, a better development of the housing market in 
Brazil. Despite the existence of housing medium term (ten-years) prefixed financing, 
                                                           
30 Long term interest rates are the ones that suffer the most the effects of inflation uncertainty. 
31 Another adverse consequence was the increase of the so-called quasi-fiscal deficit, which reached a 
large amount and today is still a burden for the future generations. Even considering that the “financial 
engineering” of these contracts has, in some extent, a political component, price stability does not aloud 
this type of disequilibrium to arise.  24
the interest rates charged are so high that prevent several people to use it. In the same 
way inflation uncertainty have been preventing the issuing of prefixed medium and long 
term public bonds. It is not difficult to conclude that those markets that deal with longer 
periods are the ones that suffer the most the effects of inflation uncertainty. 
 
This kind of market is necessary to make viable projects that are profitable only in the 
long run. That is, the inexistence of long term contracts foster mainly short-run 
investments to the detriment of long-run investments, which may be a more efficient 
way of investment (Briault, 1995). 
 
In the same way, inflation uncertainty fosters some specific kinds of investments, at the 
expense of others more productive. This is the case, for example, of the investment on 
real assets, especially real state, which works as protection against inflation. In addition 
to the loss of economic efficiency, this fact may produce serious disequilibria with high 
adjustment costs in the future. 
 
The Brazilian experience is peculiar in this regard, since during the high inflation 
period, due to inflation uncertainty and to imperfect indexation of tenancy agreements, a 
significant fraction of house owners preferred to keep their houses empty than to rent 
them. Therefore, a peculiar situation was created, in which real estate was considered a 
good investment (hedge against inflation) and, at the same time, due to inflation, very 
often they did not produce any income, since landlords refuse to rent their property. 
 
Inflation uncertainty also encourages the creation of financial instruments that offer 
protection against inflation surprises in the future and its effects on other economic 
variables.
32 This protection, however, have a cost which many times can be high. That 
is, in the same way as in the last case, productive resources are diverted to economic 
activities that the sole purpose is to protect against inflation uncertainty costs.
33 Besides 
that, as note Coletti e O’Reilly (1998), many times protection strategies used are so 
complex that may, ironically, increase and not decrease, the associated risks. However, 
                                                           
32 As already seen, even if inflation is perfectly anticipated, there is an incentive to the creation of new 
financial instruments and, therefore, to the increase of the size of the financial system as a proportion of 
GDP. In this case, one should differentiate between those financial instruments that aim to protect against 
the loss of purchasing power and those which aim to minimise the effects of inflation uncertainty. 
33 Notice that, even if it is worthwhile from an individual point of view, from an economic point of view  25
even when this is not the case, these instruments are not always viable or are accessible 
to all economic agents. 
 
In the time inflation was high in Brazil, inflation uncertainty demanded that several 
private banks built their own team of price survey with the aim of forecast future 
inflation. This example illustrates well the how productive resources were diverted. 
  
In addition to the uncertainty regarding future interest rates, inflation uncertainty also 
affects, directly or indirectly, expectations regarding other economic variables values. 
For example, the two main theories of exchange rate determination show that the 
exchange rate is influenced by both the interest rate and the inflation rate. In this 
manner, inflation uncertainty implies additional uncertainty concerning future nominal 
and real exchange rates. 
 
Inflation uncertainty also means uncertainty regarding future real wages, prefixed 
financing payments and some kinds of income.
34 For example, in this situation the real 
interest payments of prefixed bonds are uncertain as the real value of any prefixed 
financing instalments. This uncertainty harms economic agents planning and decrease 
economic efficiency. 
 
Similarly, due to the imperfect indexation of the tax system inflation uncertainty means 
that future effective tax rates are uncertain and, therefore, the real return of investments 
and financial applications are also uncertain. As seen, this fact distorts consumption and 
saving decisions and harm capital accumulation. 
 
Finally, frustrated expectations regarding future inflation (and, therefore, interest rate) 
can produce unexpected wealth transfer from creditors to debtors and vice-versa. This 
will happen whenever contracts are denominated in nominal terms and occurred 
inflation is different from expected inflation. Despite difficult to measure, these 
redistributive costs can be highly significant causing default of firms and banks and 
even producing financial crisis. This was the main cause of the crisis in the savings and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
there is loss of efficiency and social welfare. 
34 As real future wages are less than expected the probability of strikes increases. This events decrease 
social welfare in so far as not only they harm the workers involved but, many times, some important parts 
of the population.  26




Despite existing evidences show that inflation uncertainty increases as inflation rises, 
future inflation can be uncertain even in an environment of low inflation. The main 
reason for that is very simple: low inflation in the present does not guarantee low 
inflation in the future. Therefore, inflation uncertainty has also a time component. This 
phenomenon is common whenever policymakers have low credibility. 
 
In these cases, inflation expectations are asymmetric, since the probability that inflation 
rises is considered to be higher than the probability that inflation remains Constant or 
decrease. This happens, basically, because disinflation implies social costs. As says 
Meltzer (1997), a great part of the inflation risk stems from the fact that, once inflation 
is out of control the process of bringing it back is long and painful. 
 
If the central bank has low credibility and the economy is hit by a shock that raises 
inflation, given the existence of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment in the 
short run, economic agents will not be sure about what strategy the central bank will 
follow: give priority to economy growth and let inflation rises or seek price stability and 
tight monetary policy.
35 Therefore, even with low current inflation rates it is possible 
that real interest rate includes a significant inflation uncertainty premium. 
 
Moreover, notice that credibility is a valuable and very difficult to obtain asset, since 
once damaged, it takes a long time to regain it. Therefore, long-term interest rates can 
remain high due to inflation uncertainty despite the current level of inflation. 
 
The lack of credibility matters basically due to two reasons. First, its existence prevents 
the achievement of a real price stability environment, since future inflation remains to 
be a reason to worry about, distorting economic agents’ decisions. Second, it is believed 
that credibility decreases the cost of disinflation, since inflation expectations are an 
                                                           
35 This analysis does not get into the issue about the nature of the shock, that is, whether it is a supply or 
demand shock, or whether it is temporary or permanent, since central bank’s reaction depends on this 
information.  27
important component of inflation’s dynamic.
36 
 
Credibility is even more important when one considers that the central bank does not 
control precisely inflation in the short-run, since the economy is subject to several kinds 
of shocks. In this regard, one should stress that the way the central bank reacts to shocks 
depends on its nature and its length. However, many times it is very difficult to have a 
clear assessment about the shocks that hit the economy. If the central banks have 
credibility these shocks will not modify people’s expectations about future inflation, 
fostering a more stable environment. Credibility depends, among other factors, on the 





Before analysing the economic arguments in favour of inflation it is worth noticing that: 
a) the allegedly, and controversial, inflation benefits refer to low inflation rates only, 
since it is broadly accepted that high inflation rates are detrimental to economic growth. 
More specifically, one can say that the controversy centres itself to the question of 
which inflation rate in the 0%-3% interval the central bank should adopt as a long term 
target; b) according to most economists, the simple existence of a positive bias in 
measured inflation implies that the desirable inflation rate must be positive. 
 
That is, besides the “statistical motive”, economists also stress the role of economic 
motives in favour of “a little” inflation. The main argument is that inflation greases the 
wheels of the labour market (Tobin, 1972; Akerlof HWDOOL, 1996; Fortin, 2001). The 
reasoning is as follows: inflation improves the working of the labour market, since 
nominal wages are rigid downward. Therefore, “a little” inflation facilitates the 
adjustment of real wages when economic conditions change or when the economy is 
affected by shocks. 
 
 
                                                           
36 As already pointed out, despite its attractiveness of this argument among economists, according to 
Blinder (1998), there are no evidences that it is true. 
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As a consequence, inflation not only would milder the effects of economic fluctuations 
over income and employment level, but could even decrease permanently the natural 
rate of unemployment. That is, there would be a long-run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment at low inflation rates.  It means that the Phillips curve would not be 
vertical at low rates of inflation. 
 
An implication of this claim is that very low inflation rates would tend to produce 
higher output variability. However, as argues O’Reilly (1998), if by one hand a non-
vertical Phillips curve increases the costs of disinflation at low inflation rates, by the 
other hand it also increases the benefits of price stability, since inflation is less sensitive 
to the output gap and, therefore, it is more stable and easy to control at low inflation 
rates. 
 
Notice that, even considering that nominal price decreases of goods and services are a 
more common phenomenon than nominal wages decreases, the above argument also 
applies to the goods and services markets. All that is required is that there is some 
degree of price rigidity in those markets. 
 
Actually, there is yet some controversy about the degree (and the existence) of price 
rigidity, especially in the labour market. For example, Akerlof HWDOOL (1996) argue that 
some surveys built to measure nominal wage stickiness were not well done and, 
therefore, their conclusions are misleading. Despite the inherent difficulties associated 
with this kind of empirical investigation, some economists find this phenomenon 
sufficiently self-evident. Fischer (1996) argues: "any academic economist old enough to 
have been chairperson of the department knows that giving a small nominal increase is 
disproportionately easier than no change or a wage cut". 
 
Other economists argue that nominal wage stickiness is the result of a high inflation 
culture and not a structural characteristic of the economy (Vickers, 1999). In this way, 
nominal rigidity would tend to disappear in a different inflation regime (Poole, 1999). 
Therefore, the costs due to wage rigidity are not a valid argument against very low 
inflation targets, or even zero target inflation. 
 
  29
Furthermore, there are other ways of adjusting nominal wages downward besides 
decreasing nominal wages (Poole, 1999). Real wages tends to increase over time due to 
productivity gains. Additionally, many times earnings are composed by two 
components: a fixed part, the wage, and a variable part, which depends not only on the 
employee’s performance but also on the firm’s performance. This kind of contract has 
been more and more common nowadays. In this sense, when a firm needs to decrease its 
employee’s real wages, it only has to postpone wage increases due to productivity gains 
or decrease the variable part. That is, the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity 
might not be as important as one thinks. 
 
Indeed, the recent experience of several countries that have been pursuing price stability 
as their overriding policy objective, specially the United States and England, puts in 
danger this kind of argument. These countries have been able to simultaneously reduce 
their rates of unemployment and inflation. Despite the differences in the functioning and 
in the structure of the economy among several countries, this fact shows that low 
inflation does not mean, necessarily, increase in unemployment rates. 
 
Finally, if by one side some inflation may facilitate the adjustment of relative prices 
(grease in the wheels), by the other side it distorts the information provided by the price 
system by augmenting price variability (sand in the wheels) (Groshen e Schweitzer, 
1997a). That is, according to this argument, ironically, some inflation may worse the 
problem that, in theory, it was supposed to solve. 
 
Another very often cited reason in favour of some inflation stems from the impossibility 
of nominal interest rate to be less than zero. In reality, this is an old subject that resumed 
in importance in the last years, as several countries have been achieving inflation rates 
near to zero. By the Fisher equation the lesser the inflation rate the lesser the nominal 
interest rate. However, in certain occasions, more precisely when the level of activity is 
weak, the policymaker sometimes needs to adopt very low real interest rates and, in 
certain occasions, even negative ones. Therefore, very low inflation rates may constraint 
the capacity of central banks to do anti-cyclic monetary policy. 
 
A very often cited example in this regard is the situation experienced by Japan in the 
last years. With nominal interest rate virtually equal to zero, the Japanese central bank  30
was not able to decrease it further in order to stimulate the economy. A more profound 
analysis, however, reveals that a non-trivial conjunction of factors, jointly with past 
policy errors, have produced this situation.  In general, similar situations are very hard 
to be found.
37 That is, one can argue that the Japanese case is an exception rather than a 
rule, in a situation with very low inflation rates. 
 
Anyway, it is hard not to recognize that very low inflation rates may impose a narrow 
space to further decreases in the nominal and, therefore, real interest rates. However, as 
notice some economists, monetary policy works through several channels and the 
interest rate is only one of them, even though it is the most important (Meltzer, 1995). 
Poole (1999) argues that what matters for monetary policy is the growth of money stock 
and not the interest rate. Therefore, he says that the allegedly trap created by a rate of 
interest equals to zero does not make sense, since the central bank is always able to 
increase the liquidity of the economy. That is, even though very low inflation rates 
restrict the degrees of freedom of monetary policy, they do no make the monetary 
policy ineffective. 
 
Another argument in favour of some inflation is that in economies with inflation near 
zero, the probability of the occurrence of deflation increases (Mishkin e Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2000). In general, economists fear more deflation, especially due to its adverse 
effects on consumption, than moderate inflation rates. Nonetheless, with the advances of 
economic theory and the improvements in the “art” of central banking, this situation is 
likely to be avoided through good quality monetary policy. Furthermore, this risk seems 
to be higher only concerning zero inflation targets.   
 
Lastly, there is the argument that inflation provides extra revenue to the government. 
According to Fischer (1996), this gain is very small and does not justify higher inflation 
rates. As monetary base is generally a small fraction of GDP, the increase of 
government revenue due to inflation is not significant in relative terms. Additionally, 
inflation is known as the unfair of taxes, since not everyone can be protected against its 
adverse effects. 
                                                           
37 The Japanese case is still more difficult, since fiscal policy is also restrained given the large public 
debt. Economists as Paul Krugman, argue that the solution to the Japanese crisis is to increase the 
quantity of money in order to produce inflation, and makes the real interest rate negative fostering, 





The last two sections have shown several inflation costs and some benefits as well. At 
this point it is important to verify what the evidences about the net benefits of price 
stability on social welfare are, that is, what is the cost-benefit associated to low inflation 
rates. As already seen, there is a consensus that high inflation rates are harmful to 
economic growth and, therefore, decreases social welfare. Nonetheless, this consensus 
disappears when one deals with inflation rates compatible with price stability (e.g. 3% 
or less). 
 
Before analysing the empirical evidence, it is important to stress once again that some 
inflation costs are very difficult to be measured empirically. This happens despite their 
clear theoretical importance and the obvious welfare loss associated. This is the case of 
the costs associated with non-anticipated inflation, more precisely, the loss of economic 
efficiency provoked by inflation uncertainty. In this regard the allocation cost associated 
to sub-optimal consumption and investment decisions stand out. The same difficulty 
arises when measuring the distributive costs, since for each winner there is a loser. 
Nonetheless, this kind of cost can cause financial crises with serious economic 
consequences. 
 
In the same way it is difficult to estimate, or even impossible, the welfare loss 
associated with the extra time and resources needed to deal with the price system 
distortions caused by inflation. It is hard to know the costs involved in searching better 
information needed to take correct decisions, and those originated by non-optimal 
decisions caused by the deterioration of the price system as well. Or yet the costs 
associated with the need of economic agents to protect themselves against the adverse 
effects of inflation. 
 
Part of these difficulties stems from the fact that GDP is not a perfect measure of social 
welfare, which is the relevant concept involved here. For example, it is well known that 
inflation foster the financial system to grow in relation to GDP. In this case, the  32
associated cost is, indeed, counted as a benefit in terms of GDP, even though economic 
resources are diverted, decreasing economic efficiency. In the same way, even assuming 
that inflation does not affect long-term growth, if it increases economic instability social 
welfare will certainly decrease, despite the fact that economic growth remains 
unchanged. 
 
Inflation costs depend on whether inflation is anticipated or not, a hard task to be 
verified empirically, especially if inflation expectations are highly heterogeneous among 
economic agents. Generally, empirical studies assume that inflation is perfectly 
anticipated.  When calculating the benefits of disinflation these studies ignore, for 
example, that two countries with the same inflation rate can have substantially different 
inflationary risk premia and, therefore, different benefits due to reducing inflation. 
 
In a similar way, it is difficult to estimate some of the allegedly inflation benefits as, for 
example, the one related to the limitation of reducing interest rates below zero. 
Moreover, this benefit may not be relevant during extended periods of time. The 
benefits derived from the grease in the wheels role of inflation are also difficult to 
gauge, since in a long enough low inflation regime prices could become more flexible. 
 
By its turn, the estimable inflation costs and benefits vary in accordance with the 
adopted methodology. For example, some estimates are derived from partial equilibrium 
models while others are originated from general equilibrium models. Furthermore, due 
to the abovementioned difficulties, empirical studies are able to capture only some of 
the inflation costs. In this way, obtained results underestimate the true inflation costs. 
Another important issue concerns whether disinflation costs are considered permanent, 
as argue some economists (e.g. Akerlof HWDOOL, 1996; Fortin, 2001), or temporary, as 
assume the majority of the economists. 
 
As a consequence, the results about price stability benefits vary a great deal, and there is 
no consensus about the subject. Today, however, it is known that the raw benefits of 
inflation are higher than those believed in the beginning of the 90’s (O'Reilly, 1998). 
This fact is due, essentially, to a better quantification of the costs caused by the perverse 
interaction between inflation and the tax system. 
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In fact, empirical studies identify this cost as the most significant cost of inflation.
38 
Feldstein (1996) estimate it using a partial equilibrium model and calculates that 
reducing (a perfectly anticipated) inflation by two percentage points implies an 
additional growth of 1% per year for the United States.
39,40 In a similar study, Bakhshi 
HWDOOL (1997) estimate a smaller gain for England, although yet relevant, 0,2% per year. 
The benefits calculated by Tödter e Ziebarth (1997) for Germany amount significant 2% 
per year, due to the high saving rate, high taxation of capital gains and the non-indexed 
tax system in that country. 
According to Briault (1995) the true cost of the adverse interaction between inflation 
and the tax system is the one derived from adapting the tax system and financial 
contracts (indexation), and not the loss originated from the above adverse interaction.
41  
With regard to the other inflation costs (e.g. shoe leather costs, menu costs, etc...), the 
estimates show an order of magnitude well below as the ones showed above, despite the 
big dispersion among estimates.
42 
 
Among the inflation benefits, the allegation that inflation makes real wages (and other 
economic prices) more flexible stands out, i.e. inflation greases the working of the 
labour market. According to Akerlof HWDOOL (1996) this benefit helps to decrease the 
natural rate of unemployment. In the other hand, by distorting the information provided 
by the price system, inflation also harms its functioning. In fact, Groshen and 
Schweitzer (1997a) show evidences that these two effects exist in the labour market in 
United States. In this way, Groshen and Schweitzer (1997b) conclude that: a) the net 
benefit of inflation is very small and disappears for inflation rates above 2,5%; b) this 
result does not allow one to pursue positive inflation rates, but also does not provide 
evidences about the optimal inflation rate.  
 
                                                           
38 Despite the empirical evidences show that the most significant cost of inflation stem from the perverse 
interaction between inflation and the tax system, one cannot state that this is the main cost of inflation. 
Although hard to measure, it is likely that the costs derived inflation uncertainty are the most important. 
39 More specifically, Feldstein (1996) analyses the distortions cause on consumption demand for money, 
public debt and the housing market. 
40 More recent studies, which use general equilibrium models, show that the costs can be even higher (e.g. 
Bullard e Russel, 1999).  
41 This points leads to the discussion about what is the best way of fighting inflation costs: to decrease the 
inflation rate or to index the economy? Basically, due to the observed difficulties in several countries in 
this regard (absence or partial indexation), some economists argue that the second option is not viable. 
42 O’Reilly (1998) presents an empirical survey about several inflation costs.  34
Nonetheless the absence of empirical studies that compare all costs and benefits of 
inflation in the same framework (Coletti e O’Reilly, 1998), some studies try to estimate 
the net benefit (or cost) of price stability. In this case, it is fundamental to determine 
whether disinflation costs are transitory or permanent. 
 
Using the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) from the Central Bank of Canada, Black 
HW DOOL (1998) measure the net benefit of price stability for the Canadian economy, 
comparing the present value of low inflation benefits to the required costs to achieve it 
and maintain it. The authors consider different hypotheses about the way the economy 
works, by using different estimates found in the literature concerning specific inflation 
costs and benefits and adopting different discount rates as well.
 43 
 
In order to compare and standardize the results of several empirical studies, the authors 
have created a welfare measure called equivalent variation.
44 With the aim of 
considering different hypothesis regarding the way the economy works, they have 
augmented the QPM. In this way, the model was able to incorporate important 
characteristics such as labour market hysteresis, fiscal effects of monetary policy and 
the effects produced by the restriction of zero nominal interest rates.  
 
Black  HW DOOL (1998) conclude that the benefits of low inflation exceed the costs. 
Moreover, the authors recognize that their analysis underestimate inflation benefits, 
since some of the main inflation costs were not considered (e.g. allocation costs). 
 
Bullard and Russell (1999) use a general equilibrium model in order to analyze the 
welfare loss caused by inflation. The obtained result is well above the results found in 
the literature: an increase of ten percentage points in inflation provokes an equivalent 
annual welfare loss of 11,2% of GDP. Once again, the main inflation costs are 
originated from the perverse interaction between inflation and the tax system. 
 
However, in opposition to previous studies, despite the fact that a rise in inflation 
increases the effective tax rate and, therefore, increases the difference between capital 
                                                           
43 More specifically, two costs were considered: those derived from the perverse interaction between 
inflation and the tax system, and those originated from reducing the inflation tax. 
44 The equivalent variation is defined as the required proportional increase in household consumption 
each year, in the high inflation equilibrium, so as to they are as well as in the low inflation equilibrium.  35
gains before and after tax, in this particular case the gain before tax decreases. [e.g. in 
Feldstein (1996) it is assumed constant].
45 This factor is the main responsible by the 






Section 2 has showed that despite the consensus among economists about the concept of 
price stability, there are difficulties in defining it operationally. Nonetheless, one can 
say that there is a consensus that inflation rates above 3% are not compatible with the 
concept of price stability. Therefore, it can be said that the 0%-3% interval reflects the 
“size of disagreement” among economists. Having said that, the relevant question turns 
out to be: what rate of inflation the central bank should aim within the above interval? 
Or put in a different way: what is the optimal rate of inflation? 
 
Despite the advances in the measurement of inflation costs and benefits in the last years, 
it is still not possible to reach a consensus in this regard. Indeed, as Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) alert, the optimal inflation rate is still an unresolved issue. 
Basically, this situation can be explained by two factors: a) despite its importance, 
several inflation costs are hard to measure as, for example, those provoked by inflation 
uncertainty, especially the allocation costs. The same occurs concerning distributive 
costs, since the loss of one individual is equal to the gain of another individual. It is also 
difficult to measure some costs originated by living with inflation (e.g. the time and 
resources spent with price search); b) the costs of inflation depends on institutional 
characteristics, as the degree of indexation of the economy and the rigidity of the labour 
market. 
 
Furthermore, as already mentioned, there is a great discrepancy in inflation costs 
estimates. This difference is partially explained by the fact that different economists use 
different methods and techniques to gauge these costs. For example, while some 
                                                           
45 That happens since the authors consider that the government decreases the amount of resources 
borrowed from the public, resulting from the higher tax collection due to inflation [in Feldstein (1996), 
the government decreases the tax rate of other taxes).    36
economists use partial equilibrium models others use general equilibrium models. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the optimal inflation rate. 
 
First, since inflation is not precisely controlled by central bank, the inflation target 
should encompass some kind of interval.
46 Second, “the size of disagreement” about the 
operational definition of price stability together with the estimated costs of inflation, 
suggest that the optimal central target should be less than 3%. In fact, there are several 
empirical evidences which show that the cost-benefit of reducing inflation is positive 
and high, even considering low inflation rates (Feldstein, 1996; Black HWDOOL, 1998; 
O´Reilly, 1998, Bullard e Russell, 1999).
47 Moreover, it should be stressed that 
empirical studies take into account only some inflation costs. Third, inflation costs and 
benefits depend on institutional factors (e.g. tax legislation) and structural factors 
(labour legislation). In the same way, the size of inflation measurement bias is different 
for each country. These facts show that it does not make sense the idea of an optimal 
inflation rate for all countries. Fourth, the recent economic performance of several 
countries shows that it is worthy to purse low inflation rates. 
 
Table 1 shows that the average inflation rate for nine industrializes countries, in the last 
five years, was below 2,7%. By its turn, Table 2 shows the long run inflation targets for 
nine countries which adopt the inflation targeting regime and for the European Central 
Bank. With the exception of Chile and Israel, the upper interval bound is not higher than 
3%.
48 In the same way, Chile and Israel are the only countries that have central targets 
equal or above 3%. 
 
These evidences are in accordance with the above analysis, at least when deals with 
industrialized countries, but is also raise one question. Why Chile and Israel have 
adopted higher inflation targets? According to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000), the 
inflation target for rapid growing countries, a common characteristic of several 
emerging countries, should be slightly above of those targets for industrialized 
countries. 
                                                           
46 The interval may be explicit, as in the majority of countries, or implicit, as in England. 
47 Note that Black HWDOO also consider the possibility of hystereris and other kinds of rigidity. 
48 Despite the target for England is punctual and equal to 2,5%, if inflation rises above 3,5% the Bank of 
England is obliged to issue an open letter explaining the motives why the target was breached. The same 





New Zealand  0%-3% 
Canada 1%-3% 
United Kingdom








**  below 2% 
*  If the inflation deviates more than 1% from the target the Bank of 
England must explain to the society why the inflation target was not met.  
** Despite the fact that the ECB does not adopt an inflation targeting regime, 
it has as its main objective inflation rates less than 2%. 
  
The reason, according to the authors, is based on the fact that rapid growing countries 
experience an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This appreciation is proportional to 
the relative difference between productivity growth in the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors of the economy, in relation to the rest of the world (Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson 
effect). 
 
The classical example of this phenomenon is Japan, which experienced a long period of 
strong economic growth and appreciation of the real exchange rate. Note however that, 
several other rapid growing countries, as Brazil until 1980, did not experience this kind 
of phenomenon.
49 In other words, this fact cannot be taken for granted. And, more 
importantly, it should be stressed that there is no direct implication between real 
exchange rate appreciation and the value of the inflation target for rapid growing 
countries. Actually, the authors’ argument translates essentially a policy choice 
regarding the future path of the nominal exchange rate. Actually, given inflation’s 
adverse effects this option does not seem to be the most adequate. 
Real exchange rate appreciation may occur due to two motives: the internal inflation 
rate is higher than the external one, or the fall of the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, 
there is no real need why rapid growing countries should adopt an inflation target above 
                                                                                                                                                                          
England is above 3%.  
49 Brazil was one of the countries that grew more in the world between 1940 and 1980, 6,4% on average 
per year.  38
external inflation, unless due to an economic policy choice. If internal inflation is higher 
than external inflation and if, indeed, Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect comes into play, 
the nominal exchange rate will remains constant or will depreciate less than the 
difference between internal and external inflation. However, if internal and external 
inflation rates (targets) are equal, the real exchange rate appreciation will occur through 
the falling of the nominal exchange rate. 
 
Besides the path of the nominal exchange rate, there are two other relevant implications 
regarding the choice of a higher internal inflation target. First, a higher inflation rate 
means lesser social welfare and credibility for the central bank. Second, if internal and 
external inflation are equal, the real exchange rate appreciation (assuming the Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson applies for a particular country) will be determined by market 
forces. By the other hand, by choosing a higher inflation target the government assumes 
a priori that this effect will happen with certainty (which may indeed never happen) and 
choose through which channel this effects will affect the economy (e.g. via higher 





*  0% 
Meltzer (1997)  near 0% 
Feldstein (1996)  0% 
Fischer (1996)  2% (1% - 3%) 
* Abstracting from inflation measuring problems. 
 
Table 3 shows what should be the long-term inflation rate according to some 
economists.
50 Once again, one does not observe inflation targets above 3%. Moreover, 
three of them support the view that the long-term inflation rate should be near zero. 

                                                           
50 William Poole and Tomas Meltzer are, respectively, president and former president of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis.   39
±&RQFOXVLRQ 

Inflation is an old subject of economists’ interests, however controversies about its 
economic effects still remain, especially in relation to the net benefits of low inflation. 
Indeed, despite the findings of several empirical studies showing the existence of a 
negative long run relation between inflation and economic growth, there are yet no 
robust evidence that this relation holds for low inflation rates (i.e. below 10%). Even 
though, there is consensus amongst economists and central bankers that price stability 
should be the overriding objective of monetary policy. 
 
This apparent paradox is justified, among other factors, by the sharp evolution of the 
literature about the costs and benefits of inflation in the last ten years. Note that, 
differently from the abovementioned studies this literature has another approach, since it 
main focus is on inflation’s microeconomic effects. More precisely, there has been a 
great development in the identification and measurement of the adverse effects derived 
from of the interaction between inflation and the tax system. By the other hand, some 
arguments in favour of “some” inflation have also gained terrain in the same period. 
 
In this way, despite the current consensus about the benefits of price stability, there still 
remains undefined what should be the long-run inflation rate and, more specifically, 
what is the optimal rate of inflation. 
 
The empirical difficulties associated to the determination of the cost-benefit of price 
stability stem, among other factors, from the absence of long periods of low inflation. 
This fact is particularly relevant, since several studies show that the benefits of price 
stability are permanent but materialize themselves slowly over time. By the other hand, 
the costs of reducing inflation are high and take place in short periods of time. Often, 
this situation enables people to have a myopic view about the real effects of inflation 
and how it affects social welfare. 
 
Another difficulty stems from the fact that some inflation costs are counted as benefits. 
For example, inflation fosters the growth of the financial system in relation to GDP. 
This fact makes one be aware that GDP is an imperfect measure of social welfare.  40
Another very important factor is that some of the inflation costs are very hard to 
measure empirically. For example, this is the case of the higher cost involved in 
decision making (or the existence of sub-optimal decisions) due to the deterioration of 
the price system. 
 
The existence of tax systems that are not perfectly indexed to inflation causes 
undesirable consequences to the economy, since whenever there is inflation there is an 
increase in the effective tax rates. This happens to the income tax, since whenever the 
income tax table is not corrected by inflation the effective tax rates for all income levels 
increases, decreasing people’s available income and, therefore, decreasing consumption 
and GDP. As seen, the imperfect indexation of the tax system also affects adversely 
investment and saving decisions. 
 
One can say, therefore, that inflation acts, at the same time, as a direct tax (inflationary 
tax) and an indirect tax (increasing the effective tax rates of other taxes). Besides, 
inflation is the most unfair of taxes, since it affects with more intensity the poorer, 
which have fewer resources to protect themselves against its undesirable effects. 
 
Among inflation costs those stemmed from inflation uncertainty stand out. Despite the 
difficulties in measuring them empirically, the literature shows that they are at least as 
important as those derived from the perverse interaction between inflation and the tax 
system. Inflation uncertainty harms resource allocation and decreases economic 
efficiency. It also increases interest rates affecting adversely investments, mainly long-
run investments. In some cases, some markets disappear because of inflation 
uncertainty. The increase of interest rates also raises government spending with public 
debt services. 
 
Despite empirical evidences show that inflation level and inflation uncertainty are 
positively correlated, inflation uncertainty can remain high for long periods despite low 
current inflation. This happens, basically, because low current inflation does not mean, 
necessarily, low future inflation. In this way, it is essential that the central bank gain 
credibility by searching price stability, maintaining inflation uncertainty low. Besides 
that, it is essential the existence of institutional arrangements that minimise political 
influences on monetary policy and the uncertainties stemmed from government  41
transition as well. 
 
Since credibility is an asset that is difficult to obtain, the real benefits of price stability 
usually need long spells of low inflation to take place. This fact, together with several 
and significant costs derived from inflation uncertainty, shows that the concept of price 
stability must encompass not only low and stable current inflation rates but mainly low 
and stable inflation expectations regarding the future. Only when these two conditions 
exist at the same time is that society can profit from all benefits arising from an 
environment of price stability. 
 
Regarding the arguments in favour of “some” inflation, the main one is that inflation 
greases the working of labour market, easing the fall of real wages since nominal wages 
are usually rigid downwards. As a consequence, very low inflation rates can increase 
permanently the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
 
This argument is controversial empirically, since different studies reach different 
conclusions, and theoretically as well, since some economists argue that price rigidity 
would not exist in a true price stability regime. Moreover, the recent experience of 
countries such as the United States and England have shown that low inflation rates do 
not imply, necessarily, an increase in unemployment rates. Indeed, in those countries the 
fall of inflation have happened together with the fall in unemployment rates. 
 
Another two arguments in favour of “some” inflation refer to the existence of a positive 
bias in the measurement of inflation and to the loss of degrees of freedom in the conduct 
of monetary policy when inflation is very low. 
 
Concisely, currently one knows that inflation costs are higher than was thought in the 
beginning of the decade of 1990, and that many of these costs are very hard to be 
measured empirically. Indeed, there are well established theoretical reasons which show 
why inflation and inflation uncertainty decrease social welfare, regardless of the 
empirical difficulties found. And, despite the consensus about the desirability of price 
stability, it still remains controversies regarding the net benefits of low inflation. 
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Actually, the issue of the optimal rate of inflation is yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, the 
available evidences allow one to draw some conclusions: a) the net benefits of reducing 
inflation seem to be high, even when inflation is low; b) the costs and benefits of 
inflation depend on economic and institutional characteristics of each country as, for 
example, the degree of indexation of the economy and the flexibility of the labour 
market; c) the main central banks around the world have been pursuing long term 
inflation targets around 2%. However, since inflation is not controlled precisely in the 
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